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CURRENT LEGISLATION
RENEWED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVISION OF SECTION 50-E
OF THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAw.--The Judicial Council of New

York has repeatedly recommended that Section 50-e of the General
Municipal Law be amended.2 The theme of this treatment is that
these recommendations are soundly conceived.
I.

The Genesis of the Section

It is a comparatively recent innovation in the law that a public
corporation may be liable for the torts of its officers and employees,
when the act it has authorized is done pursuant to a governmental

function as distinguished from a proprietary function of the corporation." This imputation of liability has flowed from two principal
sources, the enactment of specific statutes 4 relating to liability for
specific acts or omissions, and from the construction given to the
absolute waiver by the State of New York of its time honored immunity from tort liability. 5
However, there has arisen a qualification to this liability in the
form of the rule that, as a condition precedent to the liability of a
public corporation in tort, it must be given timely notice of the claim.'
The details attending the fulfillment of this substantive requirement
were the subject matter of particularly local legislative enactments
in which each municipality prescribed the form this notice must take
and the manner and time in which it must be given.7 Thus, a claimant was confronted by a formidable mass of municipal ordinances
which were both highly technical and greatly diversified; further, he
had to comply with all of the requirements of the applicable provision with technical perfection for the courts had enunciated the doctrine that anything short of strict compliance did not constitute the
notice required to be given as a condition precedent to suit on the
1 Laws of N. Y. 1945, c. 694,
215 REP. JUDICIAL COUNCIL

§ 1.

86 (1949); 14
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(1948); 13 REP. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 34 (1947); 12 REP. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 59
(1946).
3 Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N. Y. 361, 62 N. E. 2d 604 (1945).
4 N. Y. GEN. MuNIc. LAW §§ 50-a-50-d.
5 Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N. Y. 361, 62 N. E. Zd 604 (1945)
(construing the effect of Court of Claims Act § 8 as impliedly waiving the
tort immunity of municipalities).
6 Derlicka v. Leo, 281 N. Y. 266, 22 N. E. 2d 367 (1939).
7 See 10 REp. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 292-296 (1944).
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claim.3 The result was the metamorphosis of purely procedural requirements into substantive barriers to honest claims.
The Judicial Council recognized the problem, and proposed legislation which would effect uniform provisions concerning the notice
requirement and also provide ameliorative methods for obviating the
inequities which so often resulted from the courts' application of the
existing system. 9 A draft was submitted which was bitterly opposed
by corporation counsels and officers' associations. The present statute is the result of a compromise.' 0
II.

The Efficacy of the Statute

Has the statute, as enacted and applied by the courts, effected
any substantial advancement in this field of law?
Subdivision one of 50-e has undeniably effected uniformity in
respect to the time within which the notice of claim must be given
to the public corporation, for it prescribes that the notice shall be
given within ninety days after the claim arises and shall comply with
the other provisions of the section. However, the Judicial Council
proposed a ninety-day period in the belief that this would be a reasonable period and that any shorter space of time would merely serve
to frustrate honest claimants without conferring any real benefit on
the municipality since this lengthened period would permit the corporation to make a more thorough investigation of the merits of the
claim."
The courts have rigidly applied the provision holding that
they have no inherent power to extend the period except in the instances specifically set forth in Section 50-e. 12 In the light of this
construction and the inequities it produced, the legislature in the last
session adopted the repeated recommendation of the Judicial Council
and has extended the period to ninety days. 13
Subdivision two 14 provides for the content and form of the
8
Johannes v. City of New York, 257 App. Div. 197, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 430
(3d Dep't 1939), aff'd inem., 281 N. Y. 825, 24 N. E. 2d 489 (1939); Purdy
v. City of New York, 193 N. Y. 521, 86 N. E. 2d 560 (1908) (action was
dismissed because the plaintiff in his notice of claim served on the city failed
to designate the place of the accident) ; Winter v. City of Niagara Falls, 190
N. Y. 198, 82 N. E. 1101 (1907).
9 10 REP. JUDiCiAL COuNCl. 265-296 (1944).
10 11 REP. JuDICIAL COUNCIL 51-52 (1944).
112 10 RaP. JUDICiAL CoUNCmI 269 (1944).
' FulIam v. Westchester County Playland Commission, 273 App. Div.
1011, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 837 (2d Dep't 1948); Matter of Franco v. The City of
New York, 270 App. Div. 1050, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 291 (2d Dep't 1946).
13 Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 481, § 1. This became law on April 5, 1950,
effective Sept. 1, 1950.
14N. Y. Gas;. MuNic. LAw 50-e(2):
"The notice shall be in writing,
sworn to by the claimant or on his behalf, and shall set forth: (1) the name
and post office address of the claimant, and that of his attorney, if any; (2) the
nature of the claim; (3) the time when, the place where, and the manner in
which the claim arose; and (4) the items of damage or injuries claimed to
have been sustained so far as then practicable."
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notice and in substance embodies the original recommendation of the
Judicial Council.' 5 The notice of claim must, as in theory it should,
apprise the public corporation of the material facts concerning the
claim.
Subdivision three prescribes the manner in which the notice of
claim must be served, viz., by personal delivery to or by registered
mail upon a person designated by law as a person to whom a summons in an action in the Supreme Court issued against a public corporation may be delivered. The draft of the Judicial Council specified service by personal delivery upon such a person.'0 This subdivision is efficacious in that it prescribes a rather simple method
of service, yet also provides assurance that the notice of claim will
actually be received by the public corporation. It is most important
to note that the function of the prescribed mode of service is to assure
that the notice will be received.
Subdivision five 17 must be read in connection with subdivision
one for it permits the court, in its discretion, to grant an application
for leave to file a notice of claim within a reasonable time after the
prescribed period has expired, if it is shown that the notice could
not have been filed within that period because of infancy, physical
disability, incompetency or because the claimant has died before the
expiration of that period. This follows the proposed section one
of the Judicial Council's draft,' 8 but the discretion of the court is
notably restricted for the latter part of the subdivision requires that
any such application be made within one year after the happening
of the event on which the claim is based, and before any action is
brought on the claim.
The courts have delimited the privilege accorded infants by subdivision five by invoking the rule that it can be exercised only by
infants of tender years. 19 Thus, the courts have read into the statute
the common law Doctrine of the Immature Infant.2 0 This construc10 REP. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 266 (1944).
Ibid.
17 N. Y. GEN. MuNic. LAw 50-e(5):
"Where the Claimant is an infant,
or is mentally or physically incapacitated, and by reason of such disability
fails to serve a notice of claim as provided in the foregoing subdivisions of
this section within the time limited therefor, or where a person is entitled to
make a claim dies before the expiration of the time limited for service of the
notice, the court, in its discretion may grant leave to serve the notice of claim
within a reasonable time after the expiration of the period specified in subdivision one.
"Application for such leave must be made within the period of one year
after the happening of the event upon which the claim is based and shall be
made prior to the commencement of an action to enforce the claim."
18 10 REP. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 266 (1944).
19Matter of Nori v. The City of New York, 274 App. Div. 545, 85
N. Y. S. 2d 131 (2d Dep't 1948). Matter of Witherspoon v. The City of
New York, 193 Misc. 730, 85 N. Y. S. Zd 443 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
20 See Murphy v. The Village of Fort Edward, 213 N. Y. 397, 107 N. E.
716 (1915).
15

16
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tion is not too harsh for it was the announced purpose of the Judicial Council, in proposing a provision similar to subdivision five, to
codify the applicable decisional law.21 Furthermore, it can be reconciled with the language of the statute for it is clearly stated that leave
to file a late notice will be given where the infant has failed to file
within the prescribed period, "by reason of such disability," and it
is unreasonable to attribute the failure of a twenty-year-old
22 claimant
to file within the ninety-day period to his legal infancy.
The limitation in the subdivision that the application thereunder
must be made within one year of the event upon which the claim is
based has been literally applied by the courts, 23 on the theory that
the discretion granted by the statute expires when that period elapses.
Arrayed against the weight of authority on this point are two decisions 2 4 of inferior courts, which hold that the inherent power of
the courts to afford relief to infants of tender years is not circumscribed by this provision and that the one-year period is not in the
nature of a statute of limitations running during infancy. This view
is least likely to effect inequitable results, for where the claimant is
an infant of tender years and the application under subdivision five
is not made within that period, if the limitation is strictly enforced
the claim will be barred due to the laches of the infant's parent or
guardian. Further, where the claimant is rendered incompetent as
a result of the accident and the committee is not appointed within
one year of the accident, the claim of the incompetent will be barred
by the united operation of this limitation, if strictly enforced, and
by subdivision one.25 A provision that the disabled person may give
the notice within a reasonable time after the disability ceases, is
eminently more liberal and
practically in keeping with the remedial
26
tenor of the subdivision.

CouNcIL 269 (1944).
Matter of Nori v. The City of New York, 274 App. Div. 545, 85 N. Y. S.
2d 132
23 (2d Dep't 1948).
Matter of Chavers v. The City of Mt Vernon, 276 App. Div. 855, N. Y. S.
2d (2d Dep't 1949); Matter of Ennis v. The City of Peekskill, 276 App.
Div. 779, N. Y. S. 2d (2d Dep't 1949); Matter of Martin v. School Board
of Union Free School District, Long Beach, 275 App. Div. 1042, N. Y. S.
2d (2d Dep't 1949); Matter of Moore v. The City of New York, 195 Misc.
976, 82 N. Y. S. 2d 275 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Matter of Ferris v. Board of Education of the Town of Roxbury, 195 Misc. 871, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 884 (Dela.
Cty. Ct. 1949).
24 Matter of Curtin v. The City of New York, 196 Misc. 587 (Sup. Ct
Kings 1949) (here the court states that to abide by that technical provision
would effect a perversion of justice) ; Matter of Hector v. The City of New
York, 193 Misc. 727, 85 N. Y. S. Zd 440 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (the court states
that the law does not require a man to do what he cannot possibly do).
25 See Matter of Moore v. The City of New York, 195 Misc. 976, 82
N. Y. S. 2d 275 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
26 See analogous provision recommended by the Judicial Council, 10 REP.
JUDICIAL Couxcn. 266 (1944).
21 10 REP. JUDIcIL.
22
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The power of the courts to grant leave to file a late notice of
claim when the claimant has died before the expiration of the time
prescribed by subdivision one, has been restricted to the situation
encompassed by the language of the statute.2
This is illustrated by
the holding that leave will be granted to file a late notice in respect
to the claim for conscious pain and suffering of the deceased, 28 but
no such extension will be granted in respect to the claim for wrongful
death. 29 The administrator is held to strict compliance with subdivision one in respect to the latter claim and must serve the notice

of claim within ninety days of the date of his appointment. 0
When an application is made for leave to file a late notice of
claim on the ground of the physical incapacity of the claimant, the
courts have sedulously insisted upon proof that the failure to file
within the time delimited by the express provision of subdivision one
was due to the alleged physical incapacity. 81 The determination of
the merit of the particular application depends on the court's interpretation of physical incapacity as intended by the Statute, and the
resolution of the issue of fact as to whether that condition existed.
The manner in which these applications have been handled cogently
illustrates the judicial attitude that Section 50-e is to be strictly
construed. 82 A foremost expression of this attitude is to be found in
Matter of Haas v. Incorporated Village of Cedarhurst,88 wherein the
claimant fell on the sidewalk and sustained a fractured hip. She was
hospitalized for quite some time, due partially to the fact that she
was an eighty-year-old woman. She failed to serve notice of claim
within sixty days after the accident but applied for leave to file a
late notice, on the ground of physical incapacity. Her application was
denied on the ground that there was no showing that she was so
incapacitated that the notice of claim, sworn to by her or by someone
in her behalf, could not have been filed within the prescribed period.
27 Matter of Raymond v. The City of New York, 194 Misc. 686, 88 N. Y. S.
2d 73 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Matter of Mulligan v. County of Westchester, 272
App. Div. 927, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 152 (2d Dep't 1947); Matter of Hackling v.
Board of Education of the Vestal School District #1, 187 Misc. 52, 61
N. Y. S. 2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
28 Ibid.
29 Matter of Mulligan v. The City of New York, 273 App. Div. 152, 75
N. 30
Y. S. 2d 28 (1st Dep't 1947).
Matter of Hackling v. Board of Education of the Vestal School District #1, 187 Misc. 52, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1946).

31 Matter of Aurrichio, v. City, 272 App. Div. 1047, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 765 (2d
Dep't 1947), af'd nern., 299 N. Y. 607, 83 N. E, 2d 176 (1949); Matter of
Assimenios v. The City of New York, 274 A pp. Div. 938, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 724

(2d Dep't 1948) ; Matter of Franco v. City of New York, 270 App. Div. 1050,
63 N. Y. S. 2d 291 (2d Dep't 1946).
32 Matter of Rudolph v. City of New York, 191 Misc. 947, 77 N. Y. S.
2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Meadows v. Village of Mineola, 190 Misc. 815, 72
N. Y. 5. 2d 368 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
33 275 App. Div. 1031, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 72 (2d Dep't 1948), aff'd inem., 298
N. Y. 757, 83 N. E. 2d 156 (1948).
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In contrast to this holding, the courts generally have been more liberal in their application of this phase of subdivision five.3 4 This insistence by the courts that the application be made within a reasonable
one year of the
time after the disability ceases, as well as 3 within
5
happening of the event, is not unreasonable.
Subdivision six 3 6 of Section 50-e is perhaps the most important
part of the statute for it was conceived as embodying the ameliorative aspects of the legislation. It was intended to afford a means of
obviating the inequities attendant upon the application of the old
system. 37 In general, it provides a method of enabling the correction of inconsequential and non-prejudicial errors of claimants in
attempting to comply with the technical phases of the statute. However, the scope of the discretion accorded the courts to correct such
minor defects is limited in two respects. The first of these in that
the application for leave to amend must be made before the trial of
an action or hearing on a special proceeding to which the provisions
of the statute are applicable.3 8 By virtue of a recent amendment
Section 50-e, subdivision 6, may now be implemented at or before
the trial, and if it is made before trial it shall be made by motion on
affidavits.39 This eliminates the need of implementing the adjournment procedure necessitated by the former requirement that the application thereunder had to be made before the trial of an action.
The other limitation to the power of the courts to implement subdivision six is a much more imposing barrier to the honest but understandably remiss claimant, for the subdivision expressly places beto the time or
yond the realm of correctable defects those pertaining
40
manner of the service of the notice of claim.
The courts have adhered to the letter of the subdivision rather
than its remedial tenor. This is unmistakably exhibited in the de3- Cf. Matter of Bogle v. City of New York, 299 N. Y. 620, 86 N. E. 2d
179 (1949); Cohen v. City of New York, - Misc. -, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 884
(Sup. Ct. 1949); Matter of Williams v. City of Albany, 193 Misc. 1037, 85

N. Y. S. 2d 799 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Matter of Brunstein v. City of New York,
272 App. Div. 1060, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 381 (2d Dep't 1947); Matter of Greenfield v. City of New York, 186 Misc. 903, 60 N. Y. S. 2d 333 (Sup. Ct 1946).

35 Matter of Ruskin v. City of New York, 271 App. Div. 934, 67 N. Y. S.

2d 597 (2d Dep't 1947). Accord: Matter of Russel v. Board of Education
of Union School Dist., 274 App. Div. 841, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 224 (4th Dep't 1948).
36 N. Y. GEN. MuNIc. LAW § 50-e(6):
"At or before the trial of an
action or the hearing on a special proceeding to which the provisions of this
section are applicable, a mistake, omission, irregularity or defect made in good
faith in the notice of claim required to be served by this section, not pertaining
to the manner or time of service thereof may be corrected, supplied or dis-

regarded as the case may be, in the discretion of the court, provided it shall
appear that the other party was not prejudiced thereby. Application for such
relief, if made before trial, shall be by motion, on affidavits." This subdivision was amended April 5, 1950. See note 13 supra.
3 See note 8 supra.
38 See note 36 supra.
39 Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 481, § 1.
40 See note 36 supra.
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cision in the case of Teresta v. The City of New York, 4 1 wherein
the plaintiff, within the time specified in subdivision one, sent a letter
by ordinary mail to the Comptroller, purporting to constitute a notice
of claim. The Comptroller examined the plaintiff at a hearing and
the claim was denied. The plaintiff then seasonably instituted suit.
The Supreme Court at Special Term dismissed his complaint on the
merits on the ground that he had failed to give the city notice of
claim which is a condition precedent to his right to sue the city. The
letter sent to the Comptroller was held insufficient as a notice of
claim because it was sent by ordinary mail whereas the statute specifically prescribes registered mail as the mode of service. Thus, this
defect in the manner of the service of the notice of claim was destructive of whatever substantive rights the plaintiff had, although
the city had had actual notice of the claim, which is the end sought
to be assured by the prescription of the use of a particular mode of
service. The court also stated that the requirements of Section 50-e
cannot be waived by any city official and therefore the examination
of the plaintiff by the Comptroller was immaterial. 42 The court proceeded well within the statutory schemata for herein the defect pertained to the manner of service, which is not a correctable defect,
and further no application for leave to amend had been made before
the trial. Thus, if the section is to be literally applied the defect was
not amendable, yet the decision is a fair comment on the hopeless
inadequacy of the subdivision. However, it is not illustrative of an
unusual 43
attitude, for it follows earlier and more authoritative
decisions.

The subdivision has been implemented in other instances with
salutary effect: the misdescription of the place of the accident has
been corrected; 44 the insertion of the wrong number of the trolley
involved in an accident has been amended; 4 and it has been held
that the failure to insert the date of the accident was no reason for
dismissing the complaint of the claimant on the merits. 46 However,
the courts also have ruled that a notice of claim which has not been
sworn to is insufficient in law, 47 and that a notice of claim not served
Misc. -, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 372 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
Accord: Matter of Fabricant v. City of New York, 298 N. Y. 818, 83
N. E. 2d 862 (1949), affirming 273 App. Div. 1016, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 277 (2d Dep't
1948) ; Matter of Ostrow v. City of New York, 191 Misc. 240, 77 N. Y. S. 2d
463 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
43 Matter of Weigand v. City of New York, 273 App. Div. 1025, 79 N. Y. S.
916 (2d Dep't 1948), affirming 81 N. Y. S. 2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
44 Matter of Ostrow v. City of New York, 191 Misc. 240, 77 N. Y. S. 2d
463 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
45 Matter of Turner v. City of New York, 188 Misc. 1012, 61 N. Y. S.
2d 199 (City Ct. 1945).
46Bernstein's Duck Farm v. Town of Brookhaven, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 311
(Sup. Ct 1947).
47 Lightboro Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 192 Misc. 947, 81 N. Y. S.
2d 465 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1948).
4142
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personally or by registered mail is not in compliance with Section 50-e
and could not be amended thereunder. 48 The mere statement of
these holdings is destructive of any suggestion that the General
Municipal Law has effectually remedied the inequities prevalent under
the prior system. The insistence by the courts on absolute literal
compliance with Section 50-e does49not seem to be in full accord with
the remedial nature of the statute.
The original proposal of the Judicial Council embodied a provision which was truly ameliorative in that it provided that no notice
of claim should be deemed insufficient because of any irregularity,
etc., in the content of the notice, or in the manner in which it was
served, provided that there was no intention to mislead the other
party, and that in fact that party was not misled thereby.50 Another
of its provisions stated that the courts could grant leave to a claimant
to file a late notice of claim wherein he showed a reasonable excuse
for failing to serve it within the prescribed period, if the other
party had actual notice of the facts and would not be prejudiced by
the grant of leave to serve the tardy notice.51 The sympathetic operation of these provisions would assuredly prevent the result of the
Teresta case.
The fact that these provisions are not embodied in the present
statute does not mean that the courts are powerless to relieve against
such inequitable results. In Fleischer Engineering and Construction
Company v. The United States,5 2 the late Chief Justice Hughes, in
applying the provisions of a similar federal notice of claims statute,
stated: "It is unreasonable to suppose that Congress (in enacting
the remedial notice statute) intended to insist upon an idle form." 51
The Court's decision in that case was that the failure of the claimant
to serve the notice of claim by registered mail, the prescribed mode,
was not destructive of his substantive rights since the Government
had actual notice. It is submitted that this construction is the proper
interpretation of the technical aspects of notice of claim statutes; that
our courts are attributing to the legislature the intent to insist upon
an idle form.

48 City of Broome v. Binghamton Taxicab Co., 190 Misc. 925, 75 N. Y. S.
2d 423 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Matter of H1lloran v. Board of Education of City
of New
York, 271 App. Div. 830, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 569 (2d Dep't 1946).
49 See Matter of Miller v. City of New York, 187 Misc. 926, 63 N. Y. S.
2d 44 (City Ct 1946) (the court states that subdivision 6 was enacted to
prevent miscarriages of justice and that it should be liberally construed).
50 10 REP. JUDiCAl. COuNciL 266 (1944). Note that this recommendation
preserves the rule that the moving party on an application for leave to amend
a notice claim must show that the error was made in good faith and that its
correction will cause no prejudice to the adverse party. Matter of Feldman
v. City of New York, 192 Misc. 136, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 284 (City Ct. 1948).
51 10 REP. JuDIcrAL CouNcml 266 (1944).
52311 U. S. 81 (1940).
53 Id. at 83.
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Conclusion

The decisions of the courts in interpreting and applying General
Municipal Law Section 50-e illustrated that in this area of the law,
we are approaching the periphery of the realm of law wherein the
technicality is preeminent. This is regrettable in the light of the
fact that municipalities are projecting themselves into more and more
fields 54 formerly peopled by individuals and private corporations,
whose responsibility to respond in tort is not so protected by the encrustation of technical requirements which are utilized by municipalities to frustrate substantive rights. It is true that the treasuries
of municipalities must be protected against the importunities of
fraudulent and sleeping claimants, yet this end may be attained without concomitantly frustrating the rights of honest, but humanly remiss, claimants. The original draft of the Judicial Council proffered a system by which that end could be attained and rights
preserved. A necessary preliminary to the adoption of such a system
is the institution, by the bench and the bar, of an educational campaign dedicated to the apprisal of the public and the Legislature of
the inadequacies of the present statute. In the interim, we can hope
for the adoption of the renewed recommendations of the Judicial
Council, which would serve to some extent to alleviate the inequities
still pervading this area of the law.55
PATRICK FALVEY.

A PROPOSED REFORM IN THE LAW AFFECTING SHAREHOLDERS'
DERIVATIVE AcTIONs.-That New York legislation has become a

model for many states is due to a great extent to the salutary efforts
of its Law Revision Commission and Judicial Council which study
54 Note that in the case of an adult claimant, N. Y. GEx. MIUNic. LAW

§ 50-e does not apply in respect to a claim against the New York Housing
Authority, Matter of Kaufman v. New York Housing Authority, 188 Misc.
877, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 174 (Sup. Ct. 1946), af'd, 272 App. Div. 829, 70 N. Y. S.
2d 329 (2d Dep't 1947). However, in the case of an infant claimant, subdivision six thereof has been implemented to amend the unverified notice of
claim served upon the New York Housing Authority, Matter of Belardinelli
v. New York Housing Authority, 187 Misc. 920, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 94 (Sup. Ct.
1946). It is not necessary to expatiate upon the statement that the number of
claims against the City of New York based on tort will increase appreciably
due to the city's absorption of the subway system.
55 15 REP. JUDICIAL CouNci. 76 (1949).
Note that these renewed recommendations are a reiteration of those made in 12 REP. JUDIciAL CouNcii. 5960 (1946) which pertained only to extending the period to ninety days and to
the removal of the prerequisite to relief under subdivision six, that the application be made before trial, etc. It is hoped that the scope of the recommendations will be enlarged in the future to include proposals for the revision
of the present statute by which it would approach the liberality of the original
draft proffered by the Judicial Council.

